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On 29 June 1976, the Council adopted a decision containing interim 
directives for the Commission to negotiate one or more exchanges of 
letters supplementing or interpreting the current provisions of the 
Euratom/Canada Agreement on safeguards of 6 October 1959· 
In accordance with these directives, the Commission has negotiated 
the two exchanges of letters annexed to this communication. 
The first of these (Annex I) is in the form of an amendment to the 
Euratom/Canada Agreement and broadens the safeguards clauses to 
take into account the new Canadian policy on safeguards based on 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the guiding 
principles embodied in a "gentleman's agreement" within the framework 
of the London Club. 
The second exchange of letters (Annex II) relating to Article III, 
1 (c) of the Euratom/Canada Agreement also specifies, in conformity with 
the new Canadian safeguards policy, the terms and conditions appli-
cable to the exchanges of information referred to in this subsection. 
Furthermore, the Canadians have suggested that certain commitments 
that cannot be included in the Community agreement should form the 
subject of a letter (Annex III) to be sent to the Canadian Government 
by the Member States. These commitments relate to physical protection 
and transfers of information. 
The Commission proposes that the Council approves the texts of the 
exchanges of letters in Annexes I and II. Furthermore it invites 
the Member States to accede to the Canadian delegation's request 
that they should forward the text contained in Annex III (attached) 
to the Canadian authorities in the most appropriate form. 
At the commencement of the negotiations, which have proved difficult, 
the Commission requested and obtained from the Canadians the assurance 
that nuclear co-operation between Canada and the Community would con-
tinue uninterrupted on the basis of the modus vivendi agreed last 
January pursuant to Articles IX (3) and XII (1) of the Euratom/Canada 
Agreement of 6 October 1959. The Council was informed of this arrange-
ment(*) in DOC. COM(76)133 final of 31 March 1976. 
(*) Formation of a Joint Technical Working Group responsible for 
following up the implementation of the safeguards clauses in 
the Euratom/Canada Agreement of 1959. 
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This extension of the present situation, however, will terminate by 
the end of this year at the latest. 
It is therefore necessary to effect the exchanges of letters forming 
the subject of this communication by 31 December 1976. 
• 
' 
ANNEX I 
DRAFT EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT 
OF CANADA AND THE COMMISSION 
(I) From Canada to the Commission. 
Mr. Commissioner, 
As the Commission has been informed, the Canadian Government 
has decided to require more stringent safeguards in respect of the 
sales abroad of Canadian nuclear material, material, equipment and 
information. 
This decision implies an updating of the existing Agreement 
between the Government of Canada and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom) for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy of October 6, 1959, (hereinafter referred to as the Canad~ 
Euratom Agreement of 1959) particularly insofar as it relates to 
safeguards. 
The Canadian Government and the Community consider it neces-
sary to come to an agreement through the present exchange of letters, 
to provide for the requirements of the new Canadian safeguards 
policy by amending the relevant provisions of the Canada/Euratom 
Agreement of 1959. 
Accordingly I propose that the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 
1959 be amended to include the following provisions relating to 
safeguards.: 
(a) For the purposes of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 1 
(i) The term "derived" includes thederivation of all 
subsequent generations of material. 
-, 
(ii) The term "equipment" as defined in paragraph (e) of 
Article XIV of the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 
shall be deemed to include inter alia all items listed 
in Appendix A to this letter, as well as any major 
components thereof. 
(iii) The term "information" shall mean technical data in all 
forms in which such information can be transferred 
including but not limited to technical drawings, photo-
graphic negatives and prints, recordings, design data 
and technical, operating and maintenance manuals that 
can be used in design, production, operation or testing 
.; ... 
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o£ equipment, facilities, or nuclear material except datn 
legally available to the public (that is to say published 
in books vr pc~j~djcalo). 
(b) Material which is subject to the terms of the Canada/Euratom 
Agreement of 1959 as amended by the proposals in this letter 
shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to 
further any military purpose or for the manufacture of any other 
nuclear explosive device. The foregoing undertaking shall be 
verified within Canada by the IAEA pursuant to an agreement 
between Canada and the IAEA apd_ within the Community by the IAEA 
~ursuant to agreements betweeh the Community, its Member States 
~nd the IAEA or if at any tiJe such verification procedures are 
~ot in effect, there shall be agreement for the application of a 
~afeguards system which conforms with !AEA seieguards principles 
a,nd procedures. 
(c) ~laterial referred to in paragraph (b) which is within Canada or 
t,he Community shall be enriched• reprocessed und flUbsequently 
~tored only in accordance with guidelines agr~ed ~pon between 
Ganada and the Community. In no event shall a Party use 
the provisions of the present Agreement for the purpose of secur-
ing commercial advantages nor for the purpose of interfering 
with the commercial relations of the other Party. 
(d) The Community shall inform Member States of the levels of physical 
security set out in Appendix B to this letter which should be 
applied as minima to the material referred to in paragraph (b) 
above. Canada will apply such measures of physical security as 
minima to material referred to in paragraph (b). 
(e) Any dispute arising out of the interpretation or applic~tic~ of 
the present Agreement which is not settled by negotiation or as 
may otherwise be agreed by the Parties concerned shall, on the 
request of either Party, ·be submitted to an arbitral tribunal 
which shall be composed of three arbitrators. Each Party shall 
designate one arbitrator and the two.arbitrators so designated 
shall elect a third, who shall be the Chairman. If within thirty 
(30) days of the request for arbitration either Party has not 
designated an arbitrator, either Party to the dispute may request 
the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an 
arbitrator. The same procedure shall apply if,· within thirty (30) 
days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, 
the third arbitrator has not been elected. A majority of the mem-
l?ers of the arbitral tribunal shall constitute a quorum, and all 
decisions shall be made by majority vote of all the members of 
~he arbitral tribunal. The arbitral procedure shall be fixed by 
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the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal, including all 
rulings concerning ita constitution, procedure, jurisdiction 
and the division of the expenses of arbitration between the 
Parties shall be binding on both Parties and shall be imple-
mented by them, in accordance with their respective constitu-
tional procedures. The remuneration of the arbitrators shall 
be determined on the same basis as that for ad hoc judges of 
the International Court of Justice. 
(f) The provisions of paragraphs (a) to (e) above, inclusive, as 
well as Articles III, IX and XIV of the Canada/Euratom Agree-
ment of 1959 (as those Articles are amended by the proposals 
in this letter) shall in all circumstances remain in force 
so long as any equipment or material referred to in this 
letter or in the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 remains in 
existence or it is otherwise agreed. 
If the foregoing is acceptable to the European Atomic 
Energy Community I have the honour to propose that this letter 
which is authentic in both English and French, together with Your 
Excellency's reply to that effect, shall constitute an amendment 
to the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 1959 which shall enter into 
force on the date of Your Excellency's reply and which shall con-
tinue in force so long as any equipment, material or facilities 
referred to in this letter or in the Canada/Euratom Agreement of 
1959 remain in existence or it is otherwise agreed • 
APPENDIX A 
1. Nuclear Reactors capable of operation so as to maintain a 
controlled self--custainine fission chain reaction, excluding zero 
energ~ reactors, the latter being defined as reactors with a designed 
maximum rate of production of plutonium not exceeding 100 grams per 
year. 
A "nuclear reactor" basically includes the items within or 
,Attached directly to the reactor vessel, the equipment which controls 
the level of power in the core, and the components which normally 
contain or come in direct contact with or control the primary coolant 
of the reactor core. 
It is not intended to exclude reactors which could reasonably 
be capable of modification to produce significantly more than 100 grams 
of plutonium per year. Reactors designed for sustained operation at 
significant power levels, regardless of their capacity for plutonium 
production, are not considered as "zero energy reactors". 
2. Reactor pressure vessels. Metal vessels, as complete units or 
as major shop-fabricated parts therefore, which are especially designed 
or prepared to contain the core of a nuclear reactor as defined in 
paragraph 1 above and are capable of withstanding the operating pres-
sure of the primary coolant. 
A top plate for a reactor pressure vessel is a major shop-
fabricated part of a pressure vessel. 
3. Reactor internals (e.g. support columns and plates for the 
core and other vessel internals, control rod guide tubes, thermal 
shields, baffles, core grid plates, diffuser plates, etc.). 
4. Reactor fuel charging and discharging machines. Manipulative 
equipment especially designed or prepared for inserting or removing 
fuel in a nuclear reactor as defined in paragraph 1 above capable of 
on-load operation or employing technically sophisticated positioning 
or alignment features to allow complex off-load fuelling operations 
such as those in which direct viewing of or access to the fuel is not 
normally available. 
5· Reactor control rods. Rods especially designed or prepared 
for the control of the reaction rate in a nuclear reactor as defined 
in paragraph 1 above. 
This item includes, in addition to the neutron absorbing 
~~~t, the support or suspension structures therefore if supplied 
c: .-_ ~:ara tely 
'· Reactor presnure tubes. Tubes which are especially designed 
}repared to contain fuel elements and the primary coolant in a 
~~~ctor as defined in paragraph 1 above at an operating pressure in 
e:.~ess of 50 atmospheres. 
.; ... 
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Appendix A 
7. Zirconium tubes. Zirconium metal and alloys in the form of 
tubes or assemblies or tubes, and in quantities exceeding 500 kg, 
eopecially designed or prepared for use in a reactor as defined in 
parar,raph 1 above, and in which the relationship of hafnium to zirco-
nium is less than 1:500 parts by weight. 
8. Primary coolant Eumps. Pumps especially designed or prepared 
for circulating the primary coolant for nuclear reactors as defined in 
paragraph 1 above. 
9. Facilities for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements, 
and equipment especially designed or prepared the~ore. 
A "Facility for the reprocessing of irradiated fuel elements" 
includes the equipment and components which normally come in direct 
contact with and directly control the irradiated fuel and the major 
nuclear material and fission product processing streams. In the 
present state of technology only two items of equipment are considered 
to ful::.. within the meaning of the phrase "and equipment especially 
designed or prepared therefore". These items are : 
(a) Irradiated fuel element chopping machines : remotely operated 
equipment especially designed or prepared for use in a repro-
cessing plant as identified above and intended to cut, chop 
or shear irradiated nuclear fuel assemblies, bundles or rods; 
and 
(b) Critically safe tanks (e.g. small diameter, annular or slab 
tanks) especially designed or prepared for use in a reproces-
sing plant as identified above, intended for dissolution of 
irradiated nuclear fuel and which are capable of withstanding 
hot, highly corrosive liquid, and which can be remotely 
loaded and maintained. 
10. Facilities for the fabrication of fuel elements. 
A "facility for the fabrication of fuel elements" includes 
the equipment : 
(a) Which normally comes in direct contact with or directly 
processes, or controls, the production flow of nuclear 
material, or 
(b) v/hich seals the nuclear material within the cladding. 
The whole set of items for the foregoing operations, as well 
as individual items intended for any of the foregoing operations, and 
for other fuel fabrication operations, such as checking the integrity 
of the cladding or the seal, and the finish treatment to the snlid 
fuel. 
./ ... 
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Appendix A 
Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially 
designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of 
uranium. 
"Equipment, other than analytical instruments, especially 
designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium" in-
cludes each of the major items of equipment especially designed or 
prepared for the separation process. 
12. Facilities for the production of heavy water. 
A "facility for the production of heavy water" includes the 
plant and equipment specially designed for the enrichment of deuterium 
or its compounds. 
13. Major components of Items 1 to 12 above, as well as any 
significant fraction of the items essential to the operation of a 
facility for the reprocessing or enrichment of nuclear material or 
the production of heavy water. 
• 
.. 
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APPENDIX B 
Levels of Physical Protectio~ 
The levels of physical protection to be ensured by the appro-
priate governmental authorities in the use, storage and transportation 
of the materials of the attached table shall as a minimum include pro-
tection characteristics as follows : 
CATEGORY III 
Use and Storage within an area to which access is controlled. 
Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangement 
between sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between 
states in case of international transport specifying time, place and 
procedures for transferring transport responsibility. 
CATEGORY II 
Use and Stora5e within a protected area to which access is controlled, 
i.e., an area under constant surveillance by guards or electronic 
devices, surrounded by a physical barrier with a limited number of 
points of entry under appropriate control, or any area with an equi-
valent level of physical protection. 
Transportation under special precautions including prior arrangement 
between sender, recipient and carrier, and prior agreement between 
states in case of international tz·ansport specifying time, place and 
procedures for transferring transport responsibility. 
CATEGORY I 
Materials in this Category shall be protected with highly reliable 
systems against unauthorized use as follows : 
Use and Storage within a highly protected area, i.e., a protected 
area as defined for Category II above, to which, in addition, access 
is restricted to persons whose trustworthiness has been determined 
and under surveillance by guards who are in close communication with 
appropriate response forces. Specific measures taken in this context 
should have as their objective the detection and prevention of any 
assault, unauthorized access or unauthorized removal of material. 
Transportation under special precautions as identified above for 
transportation of Category II and III materials and, in addition, 
under constant surveillance of escorts and under conditions which 
assure close communication with appropriate response forces • 
••• Table 
TABLE CATEGORIZATION OF NUCLEAR EATERIAL 
r.:a terial f o r m 
1. Plutonium a Unirradiatedb 
2. Uranium-235 Unirradiatedb 
- uranium enriched to 20%235u or more 
- uranium enriched to 10%235u but 
less than 20% 
- uranium enriched ~5§va natural, 
but less than 10% U 
3. Uranium-233 Unirradiatedb 
4. Irradiated 
fuel 
a. As identified in the Statute of the IAEA. 
b. Material not irradiated in a reactor or material 
irradiated in a reactor but with a radiation level 
equal to or less than 100 rads/hour at one meter 
unshiclded. 
c. Less than a radiologically significant quantity 
should be exerrpted. 
d. Natural uranium, depleted uranium and thorium and 
quantities or uranium enriched to less than 10% 
not falling in Category III should be protected in 
accordance with prudent management practice. 
Category 
I II III 
2 kg Less than 2 kg but 500 less c or more g or 
more than 500 g 
5 kg or r.1ore Less than 5 kg but 1 kg or less 
more than 1 kg 
-
10 kg or more Less than 
10 kgc 
-
10 kg or more 
2 kg or more Less than 2 kg but 500 g or less 
e. 
f. 
more than 500 g 
Depleted or natural 
uranium, thorium or 
low enriched fuel 
(less than 10 % 
fissile content) e,f 
Although this level of protection is recomr.1ended 1 
it would be open to states upon evaluation of the 
specific circumstances, to assign a different 
degree of physical protection. 
Other fuel which by virtue of its original fissile 
material content is classified as Category I or II 
before irradiation ~ay be reduced one category 
level while the radiation level from the feel 
exceeds 100 rads/hour at one .::c L.-::r ,_;no-::'.ic,_._l.-;d. 
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(II) Draft reply from Commission to Canada 
Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your 
letter dated stating the following z 
Text of letter. 
I have the honour to confirm that these proposals 
are acceptable to the European Atomic Energy Community. 
ANNEX II 
DRAFT 
(III) From Canada to the Commission. 
Mr. Commissioner, 
I have the honour to refer to the Agreement between the hOVernment 
of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for Cooperation 
in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, of October 6, 1959, as amended by 
our exchange of Letters dated ---------------------- (hereinafter together 
referred to as the Cooperation Agreement) and in particular to sub-
para~raph 1 (c) of Article III of the Cooperation Agreement which provides 
that "Information regarded by the supplying Contracting Party as being of 
commercial value shall be supplied only under terms and conditions specified 
by the said Contracting Party". 
I have the honour to inform you that information as defined in the 
Cooperation Aqreement which the Government of Canada has notified the 
Community shall be subject to the Cooperation Agreement shall be supplied 
subject to the condition that it not be transferred to unauthorized persons 
or beyond the jurisdiction of the Community without the prior written 
consent of the Government of Canada, and that the Government of Canada 
will, before authorizing a transfer, provide the Community with a brief 
description of the information to be transferred. 
In addition, it shall be a condition of supply of information from 
Canada that equipment which is designed, constructed or operated on the 
basis of or with the use of information supplied by Canada or information 
derived from equipment supplied by Canada shall be deemed to be equipment 
obtained from Canada. Without restricting the generality of the fore-
goinq, in the case of significant transfers of information or equipment 
related to the enrichment or reprocessing of material or the oroduction 
of heavy water, it shall upon notification of such significant transfers 
by the supplying Party, be a condition of supply that for a period of 
20 years from the first operation of such equipment or of equipment or 
facilities using such information that equipment in any facility whose 
design construction or operating processes are of~he same or similar type 
as the ff~ility designed, constructed, fabricated or operated on the basis 
of or by u~e of such information or equipment shall be deemed to be equip-
ment sup~~ied by Can~da to Euratom. 
Equipment and facilities for enrichment, reprocessing or the 
production of heavy water shall also be deemed to be supplied by 
Canada to Euratom if they have been identified by Euratom or by the 
Government of Canada after consultations with Euratom, as using 
transferred technology, and if the other party has been informed 
in writing of such identification. 
It is the understanding of Canada that the terms and conditions 
laid down in the present letter will apply mutatis mutandis to inform-
ation as defined in the Cooperation Agreement which the Community has 
notified to the Government of Canada shall be subject to the Cooper-
ation Agreement and to equipment designed, constructed or operated on 
the basis of or with the use of information referred to above or 
information derived from equipment supplied by the Community. 
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I should be grateful to receive confirmation that the foregoing 
terms and conditions specified by Canada pursuant to sub-paragraph 1 (c) 
of Article III of the Cooperation Agreement are acceptable to the Community 
and that it agrees to take steps to communicate them to Member States 
of the Community, and that it will inform the appropriate administrative 
agencies of the Member States of the technology which is transferred from 
Canada to the Community. 
\"l 
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(IV) Draft reply from Commission to Canada. 
Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge your letter dated ••••• 
which dealt with the conditions applicable to information trans-
ferred between Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community 
as follows : 
(text of letter) 
I have the honour to confirm that the terms and conditions 
specified by Canada are acceptable to the European Atomic Energy 
Community, that it will inform Member States of them, and that it 
will keep the appropriate administrative agencies of the Member 
States informed of the technology which is transferred from Canada 
to the European Atomic Energy Community. 
.. 
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DRAFT NOTE 
From Euratom Member State foreign Ministers to Canadian Ambassadors. 
Excellency, 
I have the honour to refer to the Agreement between the Government 
of Canada and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) for 
Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of October 6, 1959 
as amended (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement). 
In addition to the obligations to Canada entered into under the 
Aqreement, I have the honour to inform you that my Government agrees that 
technology subject to the Agreement and within the territory or subject 
to the jurisdiction or control of my Government shall be transferred 
beyond the Community only with the concurrence of the Government of 
Canada and confirms that items referred to in the Agreement which are 
within the territory, jurisdiction or control of my Government shall be 
subject to the measures for physical protection described in the Agreement. 
·~ 
